Such representations of autism also seem to be committed to neuro-centric essentialism about autism or subtypes of autism (Nadesan, Citation2005, pp. 19–20). This maps on to the scientific essentialist view of natural kinds, whereby essential properties are what is definitive of such kinds (see, e.g., Ellis, Citation2001).
Full article: The reality of autism: On the metaphysics of disorder and diversity
Scientific essentialism isn’t the only way of assessing the validity of autism as a psychiatric classification. In fact, Zachar (Citation2015, p. 288) notes that there may be an unhelpful “essentialist bias” in traditional psychiatric taxonomy which assumes that an essential property is necessary for a classification to be valid. The reality of autism as a medical condition might be defended at this point if one takes the issue to be this bias rather than psychiatric classification itself. In other words, the problem could be the assumption that we need to find an essential property that can explain all instances of autism (or some subcategories of autism), rather than recognize autism’s heterogeneity. In line with this, in recent years, philosophers of psychiatry have proposed both softer naturalist as well as non-naturalist models for understanding psychiatric nosology.
Full article: The reality of autism: On the metaphysics of disorder and diversity
The most influential softer naturalist alternative (Kendler et al., Citation2011) frames psychiatric classifications as mechanistic property clusters. This notion indicates categories defined in light of a whole range of characteristic (although not singularly essential) factors that interact with each other causally and at varying levels (e.g., biological, psychological, behavioral) (Kendler et al., Citation2011). Within this framing, at least some natural kinds that lack fixed essences – most notably, species – can be thought of as complex sets of entities with “various degrees of causally supported resemblance” (Boyd, Citation1999, p. 144), insofar as they possess similar properties in light of related causal links. With psychiatric classifications, Kendler (Citation2016, p. 9) notes how
[Mechanistic] property clusters can allow us to “soften” the unsustainable demand for true “essences” in realistic models for psychiatric disorders. They give us a tractable kind of “emergent” pattern. What makes each psychiatric disorder unique are sets of causal interactions amongst a web of symptoms, signs and underlying pathophysiology across mind and brain systems.
Full article: The reality of autism: On the metaphysics of disorder and diversity
