Finally, within the neurodiversity movement, there are still remnants of the pathology paradigm that I think need to be overcome. For instance, some neurodiversity proponents still see neurotypes as natural kinds with timeless biological essences. I hope we can overcome this kind of biological essentialism since it is theoretically untenable and in my view contributes to a lot of needlessly toxic discourse. Relatedly, we also need to have more of a widespread acknowledgement that neurotype is, to some extent, fluid, and that even neurotypicals become neurodivergent if they live long enough. Working towards a more fluid and inclusive understanding of neurological identification will, I hope, not just be more liberating for neurodivergent individuals, but also help establish how the neurodiversity paradigm will be better for everyone. After all, even neurotypicals cannot live up to the ideal of normalcy. They have closer proximity to the ideal, sure. But since nobody is wholly normal, adherence to the ideal is, I think, harmful in other ways even for those who are temporarily enabled by it.
The Neurodiversity Paradigm in Psychiatry: Robert Chapman, PhD
The most influential softer naturalist alternative (Kendler et al., Citation2011) frames psychiatric classifications as mechanistic property clusters. This notion indicates categories defined in light of a whole range of characteristic (although not singularly essential) factors that interact with each other causally and at varying levels (e.g., biological, psychological, behavioral) (Kendler et al., Citation2011). Within this framing, at least some natural kinds that lack fixed essences – most notably, species – can be thought of as complex sets of entities with “various degrees of causally supported resemblance” (Boyd, Citation1999, p. 144), insofar as they possess similar properties in light of related causal links. With psychiatric classifications, Kendler (Citation2016, p. 9) notes how
[Mechanistic] property clusters can allow us to “soften” the unsustainable demand for true “essences” in realistic models for psychiatric disorders. They give us a tractable kind of “emergent” pattern. What makes each psychiatric disorder unique are sets of causal interactions amongst a web of symptoms, signs and underlying pathophysiology across mind and brain systems.
Full article: The reality of autism: On the metaphysics of disorder and diversity
